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Well-Being,	the	Self,	and	Radical	Change	
Jennifer	Hawkins			It	 is	 a	 well-known	 fact	 that	 people	 change	 over	 time.	 Sometimes	 the	 change	 is	gradual.	 Sometimes	 it	 is	 swift.	 And	 some	 changes	 are	 deeper	 than	 others,	 in	 the	sense	that	they	alter	more	significant	features	of	the	person.	In	this	essay	I	explore	cases	of	“radical	change.”	I	define	radical	change	as	change	where	either	(1)	several	of	 a	 person’s	 core	 values	 change,	 or	 (2)	 some	 deeper	 feature	 of	 her	 psychology	changes	(which	will	typically	also	result	in	value	changes).	An	example	of	a	deeper	psychological	change	might	be	a	change	in	personality—e.g.	a	change	in	one	of	the	big	five	personality	traits	discussed	by	psychologists.	Or	it	might	be	some	other	even	deeper	feature	of	the	individual	that	changes.	As	should	be	clear,	radical	change	as	I	define	it,	is	a	degree	concept.	Within	the	category	of	radical	change	there	are	more	or	less	radical	changes.			 I	take	it	that	most	really	radical	change	is	bad	for	the	person	who	undergoes	it.	 Consider	 Phineas	 Gage,	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 railroad	 worker.1	An	 explosion	sent	 a	 tamping	 iron	 right	 through	 Gage’s	 skull,	 yet	 miraculously	 he	 survived.	However,	 he	 was	 dramatically	 changed.	 His	 fundamental	 personality	 traits	 were	altered	forever	by	the	alterations	to	his	brain,	and	his	life	went	poorly	from	then	on	as	 a	 result.	 But	 there	 are	 also	 clearly	 cases	 in	 which	 radical	 change	 can	 be	prudentially	 good.	 So	what	 interests	me	 is	 the	question:	What	 explains	why	 some	radical	changes	are	prudentially	good	and	others	prudentially	bad?2	It	is	important	to	 emphasize	 that	 I	 am	 discussing	 prudential	 change,	 the	 kind	 of	 change	 that																																																									1	The	 story	 of	 Phineas	 Gage	 is	 related	 in	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 Antonio	R.	 Damasio,	Descartes’	Error:	
Emotion,	Reason	and	 the	Human	Brain.	 (New	York:	Harper	 Collins	 Publishers,	 1994).	My	 comment	simply	relies	on	the	reader’s	probable	familiarity	with	Damasio’s	way	of	telling	the	story,	which	has	been	influential.	However,	I	thank	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	drawing	my	attention	to	the	fact	that	the	details	of	the	extent	to	which	Gage	changed	remain	disputed.	See	e.g.	Griggs,	R.	(2015),	“Coverage	of	 the	 Phineas	 Gage	 Story	 in	 Introductory	 Psychology	 Textbooks:	 Was	 Gage	 No	 Longer	 Gage?”	
Teaching	of	Psychology,	42	(3),	195-202.			2	This	is	a	metaphysical	question,	not	to	be	confused	with	the	epistemic	question	of	how	we	can	come	to	know	which	changes	are	good	and	which	bad.		
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improves	(or	lowers)	the	welfare	of	the	individual	who	changes.	I	set	aside	for	now	admittedly	complicated	questions	about	radical	change	and	morality.3			 One	might	suppose	there	is	little	point	to	my	question	because	we	so	seldom	have	control	over	radical	change.	Certainly	Gage	could	neither	anticipate	nor	control	what	 happened	 to	 him.	However,	 some	 types	 of	 radical	 change	 do	 fall	within	 our	control,	and	in	the	future,	with	the	development	of	new	technologies,	more	forms	of	radical	change	may	become	possible.	Even	now,	it	 is	often	true	of	us	that	we	could	change	ourselves	in	particular	ways	if	we	chose	to.	But	while	many	of	us	engage	in	smaller	 scale	 projects	 of	 self-change,	 few	 of	 us	 seek	 to	 radically	 change	 ourselves	because	 it	 rarely	 occurs	 to	 us	 that	 a	 radical	 change	would	 be	 best.	However,	 that	
may	simply	be	an	unfortunate	feature	of	our	limited	personal	perspectives.			 	My	 own	 thinking	 about	 such	 questions	 has	 been	 deeply	 influenced	 by	 a	particular	 picture	 of	 prudential	 facts	 I	 find	 attractive.	 I	 shall	 call	 this	 view	 the	“future-based	reasons	view"	or	FBR.	This	is	a	very	general	metaphysical	view	about	what	makes	it	the	case	that	such	and	such	would	be	a	good	choice	(prudentially)	for	someone.	It	has	two	components.	First,	whether	a	choice	is	prudentially	good	for	an	individual	depends	on	 the	good	 (or	bad)	 things	 that	various	possible	 futures	hold	for	that	individual.	If	choosing	x	now	will	lead	to	the	greatest	net	future	welfare	for	me,	 then	 I	 have	 the	 strongest	 prudential	 reason	 now	 to	 choose	 x.	 Second,	 these	normative	facts	about	future	welfare	are	not	in	any	way	dependent	on	the	subject’s	attitudes	or	desires	either	in	the	present	or	the	past.	What	makes	it	the	case	that	x	is	good	for	A	in	the	future	is	not	the	fact	that	A	now	desires	x,	nor	the	fact	that	in	the	past	A	desired	x	for	her	future	self.	Nor	is	 it	the	fact	that	a	fully	 informed	A	would	desire	 it	 for	 her	 lesser	 informed	 self.	 Instead,	what	 determines	 facts	 about	 future	good	are	either	facts	about	A	as	she	is	in	the	future	or	facts	about	the	world	A	will	inhabit	at	that	time,	or	most	plausibly,	the	interaction	between	both.	In	other	words,	
																																																								3	It	 is,	 of	 course,	 possible	 that	 a	 person	might	 change	 in	ways	 that	make	 her	more	 or	 less	moral.	Moreover,	 a	morally	 good	 change	might	not	 be	prudentially	 good,	 and	 a	prudentially	 good	 change	might	not	be	morally	good.	But	the	question	of	how	to	resolve	conflict	between	prudential	reasons	and	moral	reasons	is	a	huge	topic	far	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	When	I	say	a	person	has	most	prudential	reason	to	do	x,	I	leave	it	open	whether	she	has	most	reason	to	do	x	all-things-considered.	
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the	 full	 explanation	of	what	makes	 something	 good	 for	 a	person	at	 a	 certain	 time	depends	on	facts	about	the	person	and	the	world	at	that	time.			 	To	be	clear,	what	 I	 am	calling	 the	FBR	view	 is	not	a	 theory	of	welfare,	but	rather	 a	 framework	 upon	which	 one	might	 build	 a	 theory.	 Various	 contemporary	approaches	 to	 welfare	 are	 compatible	 with	 it.	 Both	 hedonism	 and	 objective	 list	theories	 are.	 But	 then	 so	would	 be	 any	 subjective	 theory	 that	 focused	 on	 current	appreciation	of	things	(as	opposed	to	the	prospective	pro-attitudes	desire	theories	typically	stress).	But	not	all	theories	are	compatible.	As	should	be	obvious,	the	view	I	am	 describing	 rules	 out	 desire-satisfaction	 theories	 of	 welfare	 including	 the	informed	desire	versions.4	It	also	rules	out	the	idea,	accepted	by	many	theorists,	that	part	of	the	welfare	value	of	a	life	is	determined	by	the	overall	shape	of	that	life.5	It	is	beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 essay	 to	 defend	 these	 exclusions	 at	 any	 length,	 but	 the	framework	 I	 favor	 is	 compatible	with	a	variety	of	otherwise	diverse	 theories	such	that	what	I	have	to	say	should	be	of	interest	to	many	theorists	of	welfare.			 FBR	has	the	virtue	that	it	easily	accommodates	cases	of	good	radical	change.	On	this	account,	a	radical	change	represents	the	best	choice	(and	a	subject	has	most	reason	to	undergo	it)	if	it	leads	to	the	possible	future	with	the	greatest	net	welfare	value.	But	by	itself,	without	qualification,	FBR	also	appears	to	have	the	problem	that	it	 allows	 too	many	 cases	 of	 radical	 change	 to	 count	 as	 good.	Thus	 it	 seems	 that	 a																																																									4	Many	 theorists	 have	 defended	 some	 version	 of	 desire-satisfactionism,	 but	 the	 most	 popular	versions	among	philosophers	have	been	 informed	desire	 theories.	One	of	 the	most	developed	such	views	is	that	of	Peter	Railton.	See	Railton,	“Facts	and	Values,”	Philosophical	Topics,	14:	(1986):	5-31;	and	Railton,	“Moral	Realism,”	The	Philosophical	Review,	95:	2:	(1986):		It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	essay	 to	 explain	 my	 exclusion	 of	 desire	 theories,	 but	 I	 have	 explained	 my	 opposition	 to	 them	elsewhere.	 See	 Hawkins,	 “Well-Being,	 Time	 and	 Dementia,”	 Ethics,	 124:	 (2014):	 507-542;	 and	Hawkins,	 “Internalism	 and	 Prudential	 Value,”	 Oxford	 Studies	 in	 Metaethics,	 vol.	 14,	 forthcoming	2019).	 For	 good	 general	 overviews	 of	 the	 desire	 satisfaction	 approach,	 see	 Sumner	 (1996);	 Ben	Bradley,	 Well-Being,	 (Malden,	 Ma:	 Polity,	 2015);	 Guy	 Fletcher,	 The	 Philosophy	 of	 Well-Being:	 An	
Introduction,	(New	York:	Routledge,	2016).			5	Certain	theorists	reject	additive	views	(or	as	some	say	“intra-life	aggregation”)	because	they	take	seriously	the	idea	that	the	shape	of	a	life	matters	prudentially	and	assume	the	two	claims	are	incompatible.	See	e.g.	Michael	Slote,	“Goods	and	Lives,”	in	Goods	and	Virtues,	9-37.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1984),	9-37;	David	Velleman,	“Well-Being	and	Time,”	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly,	72:	(1991):	48-77;	Joshua	Glasgow,	“The	Shape	of	a	Life	and	the	Value	of	Loss	and	Gain,”	Philosophical	
Studies,	162:	(2013):	665-682.	Dale	Dorsey,	“The	Significance	of	a	Life’s	Shape,”	Ethics	125:	(2015):	303-330,	has	shown	that,	depending	on	why	you	think	shape	matters,	taking	shape	seriously	may	be	compatible	with	aggregation.	Still	it	is	clear	that	my	approach	is	incompatible	with	common	ways	of	understanding	the	shape	of	a	life	thesis.	
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defender	 of	 any	 version	 of	 FBR	 will	 need	 to	 seriously	 consider	 questions	 about	radical	 change	 and	what	 explains	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 good	 cases	 and	 the	bad.			 My	overall	aims	are	really	quite	modest.	My	 first	 is	 simply	 to	articulate	 the	issues	vividly,	and	thereby	enable	philosophers	to	feel	the	force	of	a	certain	kind	of	problem	 that,	 as	 I	 see	 it,	 has	 all	 too	 often	 been	 overlooked.	 Second,	 I	 hope	 to	convince	 philosophers	 that	 some	 of	 what	 seem	 like	 the	 more	 obvious	 ways	 to	resolve	the	problem—attempts	that	invoke	one	or	another	notion	of	identity—fail.	No	doubt	many,	once	convinced	that	the	simple	solutions	are	flawed,	will	think	that	the	obvious	next	move	is	to	adopt	a	more	sophisticated	and	nuanced	version	of	the	same	general	strategy.	Yet	 I	hope	 to	make	 it	clear	 that	any	such	move	must	 try	 to	answer	a	deeper,	as	yet	unanswered	question,	about	 the	relationship	between	 the	self	and	welfare.			 	
§1.0		Good	Radical	Change				 	I	begin	by	presenting	a	case	where	it	seems	intuitively	plausible	that	radical	change	would	be	prudentially	good.			 Consider	 Sharon.	 Sharon	 is	 a	 creative,	 artistically	 talented	 painter.	Unfortunately,	however,	she	 is	also	predisposed	to	unipolar	depression.	Beginning	in	 young	 adulthood	 she	 experiences	 recurrent	 episodes	 of	what	 psychiatrists	 call	“major	 depression.”	When	 she	 is	 depressed	 she	 can’t	 do	 her	 artwork,	 or	much	 of	anything	else.	But	when	she	emerges	 from	a	depression	she	can	return	 to	her	art.	Importantly,	the	depressive	episodes	take	a	toll	not	only	on	her	creative	work,	but	also	on	her	personal	relationships.			 Significantly,	Sharon	has	a	certain	 image	of	herself	 to	which,	over	 time,	she	has	 become	 deeply	 attached.	 It	 is	 the	 description	 under	 which	 she	 now	 values	
herself.	She	values	art,	of	course.	But	she	also	values	being	an	artistic	person,	which	she	equates	not	simply	with	painting	but	with	a	certain	lifestyle	and	with	a	certain	degree	of	social	nonconformity.	 In	the	past,	when	struggling	with	her	depressions,	she	 has	 often	 comforted	 herself	 with	 the	 thought	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 certain	 people,	
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artistic	creativity	and	depressive	mental	illness	appear	to	be	somehow	linked.6		As	a	result	she	has	brought	herself	to	a	point	where	she	thinks	of	her	depression	as	the	price	she	pays	for	artistic	creativity.	Not	only	is	she	resigned	to	her	illness,	but	she	has	even	become	somewhat	proud	of	 it	because	 it	 seems	(to	her)	a	mark	of	other	qualities	 she	 values.	 When	 Sharon	 contemplates	 the	 lives	 of	 various	 people	 she	knows,	 she	 judges	 their	 lives	 to	 be	 (in	 contrast	 with	 hers)	 lacking	 in	 depth	 and	meaning.			 Now	 let	 us	 suppose	 a	 medication	 exists	 that	 could	 really	 help	 Sharon	 by	putting	a	halt	to	the	extreme	emotional	cycles	she	currently	experiences.	However,	Sharon	is	skeptical	about	trying	it.	As	we	have	seen,	she	has	already	formed	a	self-narrative	in	which	depression	is	partly	explained	as	a	special	sign	of	giftedness.	And	because	 of	 this	 she	 is	 now	 reluctant	 to	 give	 it	 up.	 She	 is	 also	 afraid	 that	 the	medication	 might	 change	 her	 in	 ways	 that	 she	 can’t	 anticipate,	 but	 which	 she	 is	pretty	sure	she	(as	she	is	now)	wouldn’t	like.	She	is	both	worried	that	it	will	make	her	“shallow”	as	opposed	to	“deep”	and	more	concretely,	that	it	may	interfere	with	her	artistic	development.	She	fears	she	won’t	be	creative	in	the	same	way	or	to	the	same	extent	if	she	takes	medication.			 These	 are	 Sharon’s	 fears.	 Now	 let’s	 assume	 they	 are	 well-founded.	 Let’s	assume	that	if	Sharon	doesn’t	take	the	medication	she	will	continue	to	suffer	major	depressions	 and	 this	 will	 continue	 to	 limit	 her	 creative	 work.	 It	 will	 continue	 to	make	her	life	difficult	in	a	variety	of	ways,	and	it	will	rule	out	certain	kinds	of	long-term	meaningful	relationships.	If	she	does	take	the	medication,	however,	it	will	have	a	variety	of	effects	on	her.	On	the	one	hand,	 it	will	 lift	 the	depressions	completely.	However,	 it	 will	 simultaneously	 alter	 her	 personality	 in	 subtle	 ways,	 and	 this,	 in	turn,	 will	 lead	 to	 her	 abandoning	 her	 current	 work.	 Though	 she	 will	 always	appreciate	 art,	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons,	 the	 person	 she	 would	 become	 with																																																									6	It	 is	well	established	that	poets,	 fiction	writers,	visual	artists	and	musicians	are	much	more	 likely	than	ordinary	people	 to	suffer	 from	either	manic-depressive	 illness	 (bi-polar	disorder)	or	unipolar	depression.	For	example,	one	study	found	rates	of	depression	8	to	10	times	higher	among	artists	and	writers	 than	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 population.	 See	 Kay	 Redfield	 Jamison,	 Jamison,	 Touched	with	 Fire:	
Manic-Depressive	 Illness	 and	 the	 Artistic	 Temperament,	 (New	 York:	 Simon	 &	 Schuster,	 1996).	 The	exact	 nature	 of	 the	 association,	 however,	 is	 not	 understood	 and	 remains	 a	 topic	 of	 dispute	 and	continuing	inquiry.		
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medication	 would	 not	 pursue	 an	 artistic	 career.	 However,	 she	 would	 find	 other	projects	that	would	be	just	as	fulfilling	for	the	person	she	would	then	be	as	artistic	pursuits	 currently	 are	 for	 the	person	 she	 is	now.	Moreover,	 once	 she	 is	no	 longer	living	 the	 chaotic	 life	 of	 depressive	 ups	 and	 downs,	 she	will	 be	 able	 to	 form	 and	maintain	loving	relationships	and	accomplish	more	in	her	new	line	of	work	than	she	would	accomplish	in	the	old.			 I	 take	 no	 stand	 for	 the	moment	 on	whether	 the	 goods	 of	 her	 new	 life	 are	intrinsic	 or	 instrumental.	 Hedonists	 are	 free	 to	 see	 them	 as	 instrumental,	 and	 to	think	the	medicated	life	will	have	more	overall	pleasure	or	happiness.	And	objective	list	 theorists	 are	 free	 to	 imagine	 that	 her	 life	 with	 medication	 will	 contain	 more	objective	goods.	And	so	on	for	other	types	of	theorists.	I	will	stipulate	only	one	thing,	which	is	that	Sharon	will	appreciate	the	life	she	thereby	gains	if	she	takes	the	meds.	She	will	not	in	retrospect	view	the	change	as	a	mistake,	but	instead	as	an	excellent	choice.		 The	 change	 is	 radical	 in	my	defined	 sense.	 It	will	 alter	many	of	her	 values,	and	will	do	so	in	part	by	altering	certain	aspects	of	her	personality	(this	is	why	she	will	 no	 longer	 pursue	 an	 artistic	 career).	 Even	 though	 she	 herself	 has	 no	 current	desire	to	change,	and	would	not	now	view	the	possible	life	with	medication	as	in	any	sense	good	for	her,	 it	 is	plausible	that	 it	would	be	good	 for	Sharon	 to	undergo	this	change.	 I	suspect	most	readers	will	agree	with	me.	 If	 that	 is	so,	 then	they	will	also	agree	that	at	least	some	cases	of	radial	change	are	prudentially	good	and	we	should	want	a	theory	of	welfare	that	can	accommodate	that.				
§2.0		Good	Radical	Changes	&	Future	Based	Reasons			 	The	 future-based	 reasons	 view	 is	 able	 to	 handle	 certain	 cases	 of	 radical	change	quite	well.	But	only	certain	cases.	To	understand	why	this	is	so,	it	is	helpful	to	have	a	more	developed	understanding	of	the	view.			 The	FBR	view	is	first	and	foremost	a	way	of	thinking	about	the	relationship	between	good	prudential	choice	and	prudential	value	itself.	In	ordinary	life	when	we	try	to	make	a	self-interested	decision	(or	try	to	see	what	would	be	the	best	decision	
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for	 someone	 else),	 we	 take	 it	 that	 there	 are	 various	 things	 that	 could	 be	 done.	Associated	with	the	different	things	that	could	be	done	are	different	outcomes	that	might	 follow.	 And	 these	 outcomes	 could	 lead	 to	 others	 and	 so	 on	 and	 so	 forth.	Indeed,	summarizing	this	familiar	way	of	thinking,	we	can	say	that	associated	with	each	 practical	 choice	 a	 person	makes	 there	 are	 various	 possible	 futures,	 possible	ways	that	the	life	she	has	been	living	up	until	then	might	continue.	The	FBR	assumes	that	these	possible	 futures	have	a	certain	welfare	value	for	the	subject	 in	virtue	of	the	various	good	and	bad	things	those	futures	contain	for	her.	What	that	value	is	will	depend,	 of	 course,	 on	 one’s	 preferred	 account	 of	 prudential	 value	 and	 how	much	value	various	things	are	thought	to	have.			 A	hedonist,	for	example,	will	want	to	know	of	each	possible	future	how	much	happiness	 it	 contains,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 how	 much	 suffering,	 pain,	 or	unhappiness	it	contains	on	the	other.	The	overall	net	value	(negative	or	positive)	of	that	possible	future	will	depend	on	whether	there	is	more	happiness	than	suffering	or	 vice	 versa.	Alternatively,	 an	objective	 list	 theorist	would	want	 to	 know	of	 each	possible	 future	what	kind	of	objective	goods	(friendship,	achievement,	knowledge,	etc.)	that	life	contains	as	well	as	what	kinds	of	objective	bads.	No	matter	the	theory	of	prudential	value,	each	possible	 life	continuation	will	have	a	positive	or	negative	net	 value	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	 positives	 (as	 construed	 by	 that	 theory)	outweigh	the	negatives	(as	construed	by	that	theory),	or	vice	versa.				 One	 implication	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 possible	 futures	 can,	 at	 least	 in	principle,	 be	 ranked	 from	 best	 to	 worst.	 The	 FBR	 thesis	 assumes,	 as	 do	 many	philosophers,	 that	 practical	 reasons—in	 this	 case	 prudential	 practical	 reasons—stem	from	facts	about	prudential	value.	For	any	two	possible	futures,	x	and	y	of	an	agent	A,	if	x	has	greater	net	welfare	for	A	than	y,	then	A	has	more	reason	to	choose	x.	But	 A	 has	 most	 reason,	 i.e.	 the	 strongest	 prudential	 reason,	 to	 choose	 the	 best	possible	future	or	the	highest	ranked	one,	whichever	one	that	is.			 Of	course,	this	is	a	theory	of	what	reasons	we	have,	and	not	a	theory	of	what	reasons	we	can	easily	know	about	or	perceive.	It	may	be	that	we	often	simply	don’t	know	about	certain	options,	or	don’t	 think	of	 them,	and	so	 fail	 to	 identify	 the	best	ones.	That	is	an	epistemic	problem,	and	a	serious	one.	But	then	it	seems	right	to	me	
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that	it	should	turn	out	to	be	extremely	difficult—perhaps	even	impossible—to	know	what	 the	 best	 path	 through	 life	 is.	 We	 do	 reasonably	 well	 when	 we	 are	 able	 to	recognize	 the	 more	 obvious	 paths	 forward,	 assess	 their	 relative	 strengths	 and	choose	one	of	the	better	ones.	Finally,	it	is	because	of	these	epistemic	barriers	that	normative	reasons	and	motivating	reasons	so	frequently	come	apart.			 It	 is	 important	 to	 see	 that	 not	 all	 good	 choices	 lead	 to	 what	 we	 would	ordinarily	call	good	outcomes.	One	kind	of	case	where	this	is	so	involves	bad	lives.	Sadly,	 some	 lives	 are	 so	 filled	with	 suffering	or	other	negatives	 that	 the	negatives	outweigh	any	positives	the	life	might	contain.	I	shall	refer	to	all	such	lives	where	net	value	is	negative	as	bad	simpliciter.	But	of	course,	even	within	the	category	of	lives	that	are	bad	simpliciter,	 there	can	 lives	 that	are	better	or	worse	 than	one	another.	Now	suppose	someone	faces	a	grim	choice	between	two	lives	each	of	which	is	bad	
simpliciter	in	virtue	of	containing	great	suffering.	Still,	one	life	has	less	suffering	than	the	other.	 If	 these	are	the	only	options,	then	it	still	makes	sense	to	choose	the	less	bad	 life,	even	though	the	 life	chosen	would	not	count	as	good	as	people	ordinarily	think	of	“good.”.	This	is	a	case	where	the	best	choice	does	not	lead	to	a	good	life.			 This	 idea	that	there	 is	a	point	at	which	the	negatives	begin	to	outweigh	the	positives	(however	construed)	suggests	for	many	a	way	to	draw	a	line	between	a	life	worth	living	(or	a	continuation	that	is	worth	living)	and	one	that	is	not.	And	some	go	further	and	suggest	that	when	the	only	options	available	are	lives	not	worth	living,	then	death	 is	 preferable.	Of	 course	 death	 is	 not	 a	 “possible	 future”	 but	 rather	 the	absence	of	a	future.	Still,	it	is	fairly	easy	to	adjust	the	comparison	of	futures	to	make	it	a	comparison	of	lives	that	are	the	same	up	to	a	certain	point.	If	a	life	that	ends	at	that	point	 is	better	than	any	of	the	possible	 lives	where	 it	continues,	 then	the	FBR	can	allow	that	in	such	a	case	death	would	be	better	for	the	individual	in	question.7	However,	 even	 when	 death	 is	 the	 better	 option,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 a	 real,	 practical	
																																																								7	This	is	just	the	familiar	thesis	(known	as	the	deprivation	view)	that	death	is	a	comparative	harm	and	that	the	proper	unit	of	comparison	is	whole	lives.	For	detailed	introduction	to	such	views	and	their	problems	see	Steven	Luper	"Death",	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Summer	2016	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	=	<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/death/>.	
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option,	in	which	case	it	still	makes	sense,	insofar	as	there	are	choices,	to	choose	the	future	that	is	least	bad.			 Let	us	now	consider	what	 the	FBR	says	about	radical	change.	As	we	saw	at	the	outset,	some	radical	changes	are	not	chosen,	but	simply	happen	to	us.	But	when	choice	 is	 involved	 and	we	 can	 either	 change	 radically	 or	 not,	 then	 the	 important	question	will	be	about	the	overall	welfare	value	of	various	possible	futures	with	the	change	and	without	it.	In	some	cases	FBR	will	not	rank	highly	any	possible	futures	involving	radical	change.	But	sometimes	it	will.	 	It	can	certainly	occur	that	the	best	possible	future	for	an	individual	is	one	that	includes	a	radical	change.	If	that’s	so,	the	individual	in	question	will	have	most	prudential	reason	to	undergo	the	change.			 Sharon’s	case	 is	 like	 this.	The	best	possible	 futures	 for	her	are	 those	where	she	takes	the	meds.	She	will	be	much	happier	in	the	future	with	meds,	and	even	non-hedonists	 typically	 grant	 significant	 prudential	 value	 to	 happiness.	 She	 will	 also	have	more	success	in	her	endeavors,	even	though	those	endeavors	will	be	different	in	her	new	life	than	in	her	old.	And	she	will	have	loving,	lasting	relationships.	These	three	 features	will	be	absent	 from	 the	non-med	 life,	which	will	 also	 contain	much	suffering	 from	 depression.	 If	 these	 are	 the	 only	 options,	 then	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 in	welfare	terms	Sharon	has	most	reason	to	take	the	medications.			 Here	FBR	seems	to	give	the	right	verdict.	But	now	consider	a	very	different	type	 of	 case,	 where	 the	 FBR	 view	 also	 recommends	 change.	 Consider	 the	 case	 of	Chloe	who	 is	offered	 the	 following	opportunity,	which	 is	presented	 to	her	 (by	 the	eager	 scientist	who	 developed	 it)	 as	 “the	magnificent	 alteration.”8	The	 purpose	 of	the	 procedure	 is	 to	 optimize	 future	 welfare	 prospects.	 However,	 the	 change	required	 to	do	so	 is	very	 radical.	A	person	who	undergoes	 this	procedure	has	her	mind	wiped	 clean,	 thereby	 losing	 all	 her	 beliefs,	memories,	 values,	 etc.	When	 she																																																									8	This	 example	 was	 inspired	 by	 Jeff	 McMahan’s	 example	 “The	 Cure.”	 Jeff	 McMahan,	 The	 Ethics	 of	
Killing	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2000),	 77.	 In	McMahan’s	 case	 an	 individual	must	 choose	between	 certain	 death	 or	 continued	 life	 after	 going	 through	 an	 equally	 radical	 change.	McMahan’s	purposes	are	different	 from	mine.	He	aims	 to	 illustrate	 the	 fact	 that	many	people	care	less	 about	a	future	self	that	is	radically	different	from	their	current	self.	He	goes	on	to	use	these	facts	about	care	to	 support	 his	 theory	 of	 time	 relative	 interests.	 However,	 even	 if	 he	 is	 right	 about	 most	 people’s	feelings,	 I	doubt	 these	 feelings	have	 the	normative	significance	he	assigns	 them.	 In	an	unpublished	companion	essay	to	the	present	one	I	argue	against	McMahan’s	theory	of	time-relative	interests.		
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awakes	 she	 will	 not	 remember	 her	 past	 life.	 However,	 the	 changes	 go	 beyond	alterations	 of	 mental	 content.	 The	 procedure	 will	 also	 alter	 her	 natural	psychological	 dispositions	 in	ways	 that	 “optimize”	 her	 personality,	 giving	 her	 just	the	right	degree	of	(for	example)	extroversion,	or	conscientiousness.	This	will	be	the	precise	 degree	 of	 extroversion	 (or	 conscientiousness)	 that	 most	 often	 leads	 to	happiness	(or	success	as	defined	by	other	theories	of	prudential	value).	Other	traits	will	be	similarly	fine-tuned.	After	the	procedure	is	over,	she	will	have	no	real	reason	to	try	to	re-create	her	old	life	because,	given	the	deeper	psychological	changes	she	has	undergone,	that	life	will	no	longer	fit	her.			 Chloe,	understandably,	is	appalled	by	this	description	and	wonders	why	this	crazy	 man	 thinks	 she	 would	 want	 it.	 But	 his	 answer	 is	 that	 it	 creates	 for	 her	 a	possible	future	with	much	greater	overall	well-being.	As	she	is	now,	her	life	is	going	fairly	well,	but	there	are	still	some	definite,	long-standing	problems.	The	person	she	is	 currently	 faces	 a	 lifetime	welfare	 ceiling,	 one	 she	 could	 surpass	 if	 she	 changed.	Currently,	 her	 values	 and	 her	 personality	 sometimes	 undermine	 her	 ability	 to	achieve	her	goals.	Studies	of	people	who	have	previously	undergone	the	magnificent	alteration	show	that	 it	works	wonders.	A	 fresh	start	with	a	different	psychological	profile	will	enable	Chloe	to	have	a	life	much	higher	in	overall	welfare	value	than	any	life	open	to	her	as	she	is.			 The	example	 is	deliberately	extreme.	Yet	 it	 is	not	 crazy	 to	 suppose	 that	 for	some	people	really	radical	change	would	enable	them	to	live	much	better	lives	from	the	standpoint	of	welfare.	 In	such	a	case,	 the	best	possible	prudential	 future	 is	the	one	 that	 includes	 radical	 change	 and	 so	 FBR	 says	 that	 the	 individual	 has	 the	strongest	prudential	reason	to	undergo	the	change.9	And	yet,	most	people,	including	myself,	 have	 the	 intuition	 that	 it	 couldn’t	 be	 prudentially	 best	 to	 undergo	 such	 a	change.	Not	only	does	Chloe	not	have	most	reason	to	choose	it,	she	may	have	little	or	
no	reason	to	given	that	her	alternative,	while	not	perfect,	is	still	a	perfectly	good	life																																																									9	McMahan	 says	 of	 his	 example,	 “The	 Cure,”	 that	 “most	 of	 us	 would	 at	 least	 be	 skeptical	 of	 the	wisdom	of	taking	the	treatment	and	many	would	be	deeply	opposed	to	it”	(2000,	77).	However,	FBR	will	clearly	say	that	one	ought	to	take	the	cure,	because	the	only	options	are	radical	change	or	death,	and	it	is	clear	that	the	life	after	radical	change	is	well	worth	living,	i.e.	it	has	net	positive	welfare	value	for	the	subject.		
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overall.	How	do	we	explain	this	in	a	way	that	preserves	our	original	intuition	about	Sharon,	namely,	 that	sometimes	radical	change	can	be	the	best	option,	 the	one	we	have	most	reason	to	choose?		 		
§3.0	Why	Identity	is	Not	the	Solution:	Part	I.	Numerical	Identity				 Our	question	 then	 is	why	 the	magnificent	 alteration	 is	not	 the	prudentially	best	 choice	 for	 Chloe.	What	 explains	 this	 fact?	When	 presented	with	 this	 kind	 of	case,	most	 philosophers	 reach	 for	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 answer,	 an	 answer	 framed	 in	terms	of	identity.	The	basic	gist	of	the	response	is	that	this	is	not	a	good	option	for	Chloe,	because	the	individual	post-change	is	no	longer	Chloe.	Now	it	may	be	that	the	answer	 lies	 somewhere	 in	 this	 area.	 But	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	 ways	 of	understanding	or	interpreting	this	idea	that	strike	me	as	quite	unpromising.	I	want	first	intend	to	explain	what	these	are	and	why	they	fail.	This	will	set	the	stage	for	my	explanation	of	why	I	remain	skeptical	of	the	entire	strategy.			 There	are	at	least	two	quite	different	things	philosophers	talk	about	using	the	language	 of	 identity.	 These	 are	 what	 I	 shall	 here	 call	 numerical	 identity	 and	
character	identity.10		I	examine	numerical	identity	first.	 			 Questions	 about	 numerical	 identity	 are	 questions	 about	 the	 persistence	conditions	over	time	for	a	certain	type	of	entity.	 It	 is	 true	that	 if	a	change	were	so	radical	 that	 it	 caused	 the	 individual	who	 changes	 to	 go	out	of	 existence,	we	 could	not,	in	the	cases	that	interest	us,	say	that	this	was	good	for	the	individual.	But	is	that	what	 radical	 change	 does	 in	 a	 case	 like	 Chloe’s?	 Does	 it	 destroy	 one	 of	 us?	 That	depends	on	what	you	think	we	fundamentally	are.			 A	theory	of	numerical	identity	for	x’s	presupposes	an	understanding	of	what	an	 x	 essentially	 is.	 Thus,	 closely	 allied	 with	 theories	 of	 numerical	 identity	 are	theories	 of	 our	 essence,	 theories	 that	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 what	 we	 most																																																									10	Schechtman	draws	the	same	basic	distinction	in	terms	of	two	questions:	the	re-identification	question	and	the	characterization	question.	Marya	Schechtman,	The	Constitution	of	Selves	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University,	1996).	DeGrazia	draws	the	same	distinction	in	terms	of	numerical	identity	and	narrative	identity,	but	since	I	want	my	argument	to	apply	to	a	broader	set	of	theories	of	self	than	just	narrative	views,	I	avoid	his	terminology	and	refer	to	“characterization	identity.”	See	David	DeGrazia,	
Human	Identity	and	Bioethics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005).	
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fundamentally	are.	There	are	(at	least)	three	popular	answers	to	the	question	of	our	essence.	To	begin	with,	we	are	human	beings,	a	type	of	animal.	Animalist	theories	of	identity	over	time	explain	our	persistence	conditions	in	terms	of	the	persistence	of	a	particular	animal	or	organism.11	We	are	also,	however,	sentient	creatures	in	virtue	of	 having	 a	 brain	 that	 persists	 through	 time	 and	 produces	 conscious	 experiences.	Embodied	mind	accounts	of	identity	explain	our	persistence	conditions	in	terms	of	the	continued	existence	of	a	brain	capable	of	conscious	experience.12		And	finally,	we	are	persons	in	the	philosophical	sense	of	beings	with	certain	complex	psychological	capacities	 such	as	higher-order	desires,	 and	awareness	of	ourselves	as	 temporally	extended	 beings.13	On	 these	 views	 our	 persistence	 through	 time	 consists	 in	 the	persistence	 through	 time	 of	 certain	 psychological	 connections,	 often	 described	 as	overlapping	chains	of	psychological	connections.			 For	a	 long	time	the	question	about	the	persistence	conditions	of	beings	like	you	 and	 me	 was	 referred	 to	 as	 “the	 problem	 of	 personal	 identity.”	 But	 this	description	 is	 misleading.	 It	 runs	 together	 two	 distinct	 questions.	 One	 is	 the	question	of	what	it	takes	for	the	same	person	 to	survive	a	change.	The	other	is	the	question	 of	 whether	 we	 are	 essentially	 persons,	 such	 that	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	person	I	now	am	would	be	the	death	of	me,	or	whether	 I	could	survive	as	a	 living	non-person.	 For	 a	 person	 essentialist	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 first	 question	 is	 also	 an	answer	to	the	second.	But	for	other	types	of	theorists—for	example,	animalists	and	embodied	 mind	 theorists—the	 questions	 are	 importantly	 distinct.	 	 For	 these	theorists	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 to	 accept	 as	 a	 theory	 of	what	 it	 takes	 for	 a	 person	 to	
continue	one	of	the	familiar	psychological	accounts	of	psychological	continuity,	even	while	 rejecting	 the	 idea	 that	you	and	 I	are	essentially	persons.	For	 these	 theorists	
																																																								11	See	several	examples	of	such	a	view	see	e.g.	Eric	T.	Olson,	The	Human	Animal:	Personal	Identity	
Without	Psychology,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1997)	and	Peter	van	Inwagen,	Material	Beings	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1990).				12	For	several	defenses	of	this	kind	of	view	see	McMahan	(2000);	DeGrazia	(2005).		13	There	are	many	such	views,	e.g.	Derek	Parfit,	“Personal	Identity,”	Philosophical	Review	80:	(1971):3-27	and	Reasons	and	Persons,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1984);	Sydney	Shoemaker,	“Self	and	Substance,”	in	Philosophical	Perspectives,	(Vol.	11)	J.	Tomberlin,	(ed.):	(1997):	283-319;	“Self,	Body,	and	Coincidence”	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	(Supplementary	Volume),	73:	287-306.		
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personhood	is	a	phase	of	our	 life,	but	 it	does	not	necessarily	set	the	boundaries	of	our	existence.			 Importantly,	 for	 a	 long	 time	 the	 two	questions	were	 routinely	 conflated,	 in	part	because	so	many	theorists	unreflectively	assumed	person	essentialism.	There	are	various	diagnoses	of	what	led	to	this.	For	example,	Eric	Olson	contends	that	for	a	long	 time	philosophers	conflated	 issues	of	practical	 concern—ethical	 issues—with	metaphysical	ones.	Psychological	 continuity	 theories	may	help	us	answer	many	of	our	 important	 ethical	 concerns,	 but	 they	 are	 very	 poor	 accounts	 of	 what	 we	 are	metaphysically.			 I	myself	am	inclined	to	think	I	could	survive	as	a	non-person	(for	example,	if	I	ever	develop	dementia	 and	 live	 to	 the	 end	 stages	of	 the	disease)	or	 as	 a	different	person	(for	example,	if	I	went	through	a	procedure	like	the	magnificent	alteration).	It	also	seems	plausible	to	me	that	I	started	life	as	a	non-person	(a	fetus).	On	the	view	I	favor	“person”	is	just	something	I	am	during	a	certain	phase	of	my	life,	much	as	I	am	a	parent	now.	Saying	this	need	not	imply	that	persons	are	unimportant	or	that	it	is	 not	 typically	 better	 to	 be	 a	 person	 than	 to	 be	 a	 non-person.	 However,	 the	important	point	for	the	purposes	of	this	essay	is	that	radical	change	of	the	sort	that	disrupts	 psychological	 continuity	 enough	 to	 potentially	 create	 a	 new	 person	 or	 a	non-person,	will	only	disrupt	numerical	identity	if	it	turns	out	that	we	are	essentially	persons.	So	we	can	only	hope	to	use	numerical	identity	to	explain	the	problem	with	Chloe’s	case	if	we	are	person	essentialists.			 I	have	so	far	not	explained	why	I	think	we	should	reject	person	essentialism,	but	 I	will	now.	As	 I	see	 it,	 the	decisive	considerations	have	to	do	with	 the	 familiar	notion	 of	 anticipation.	 Anticipating	 our	 own	 future	 experiences	 is	 very	 different	from	knowing	 that	 someone	 else	will	 experience	 certain	 things	 in	 the	 future.	And	when	 we	 look	 to	 intuitions	 about	 which	 future	 experiences	 we	 can	 anticipate	having,	these	suggest	that	one	of	us	would	survive	even	radical	changes	of	the	sort	described	in	Chloe’s	case.			 Bernard	Williams	offered	 the	 following	 famous	 example	 that	 highlights	 the	issue.	He	asked	his	reader	to	imagine	being	captured	and	then	told	the	following:	“A	series	of	 things	are	going	to	be	done	to	you,	but	 the	upshot	 is	 that	 the	contents	of	
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your	mind	will	be	fully	erased.		Once	the	procedure	is	complete,	the	living	individual	who	remains—an	individual	who	will	have	the	same	brain	as	you	but	who	will	not	think	of	himself	as	you	nor	have	any	memories	of	your	life—will	gradually	be	fed	a	series	 of	 false	memories	 and	 other	mental	 contents	 so	 that	 he	 comes	 to	 think	 of	himself	 as	 a	 different	 person.	 After	 this	 is	 all	 complete,	 this	 individual	 will	 be	tortured.”14			 Williams	asked	whether	or	not	 it	makes	sense	 to	be	concerned	about	what	will	happen	to	this	 later	 individual.	Obviously	you	will	be	upset	by	the	prospect	of	procedures	that	will	erase	your	mind.	But	by	hypothesis,	you	can’t	stop	that.	Should	you	 fear	 the	 torture	 that	 the	 post-procedure	 individual	will	 experience?	Williams	suggests	 (and	 I	 believe)	 that	 fear	 of	 the	 torture	makes	 perfect	 sense.	 But	 this,	 in	turn,	suggests	that	numerical	identity	is	something	that	can	survive	the	destruction	of	 all	 one’s	 psychological	 features.	 It	 can	 survive	 quite	 radical	 change	 of	 the	 sort		that	would	alter	or	even	destroy	the	original	person.				 Admittedly,	 not	 all	 theorists	 will	 agree	 with	 me,	 as	 these	 issues	 remain	deeply	 contested.	 Anyone	 committed	 to	 person	 essentialism	 will	 think	 that	 the	destruction	of	the	person	is	the	death	of	me,	and	that	there	is	no	sense	in	which	I	can	be	said	to	experience	that	later	pain.	However,	for	those	who	accept	my	rejection	of	person	essentialism,	 it	should	be	clear	that	we	can’t	explain	the	badness	of	radical	change	in	Chloe’s	case	by	appeal	to	numerical	identity.	On	the	view	I	favor,	Chloe	is	still	around	and	has	not	changed	her	(numerical)	identity	even	after	such	a	radical	alteration.				
	
																																																									14	Williams	 stops	 short	 of	 drawing	 the	 strong	 conclusion	 that	 I	 draw,	 namely	 the	 conclusion	 that	numerical	identity	can	survive	the	destruction	of	the	person.	His	paper	instead	emphasizes	the	ways	in	which	our	intuitions	can	apparently	go	quite	different	ways	depending	on	how	a	case	is	described.	However,	many	philosophers	(including	myself)	have	subsequently	been	willing	to	use	examples	like	this	one,	which	 comes	 from	Williams,	 to	draw	stronger	 conclusions	 than	Williams	did	 in	 the	essay	where	this	first	appeared.	Bernard	Williams,	“The	Self	and	the	Future,”	The	Philosophical	Review	79:	2:	(1970):	161-180.		 	
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§4.0	Why	Identity	is	Not	the	Solution:	Part	II.	Character	Identity					 There	 is	 another	 very	 common	 use	 of	 ‘identity’	 according	 to	 which	 our	identity	is,	roughly,	our	self.	An	account	of	our	identity	in	this	sense	is	an	answer	to	the	question	“Who	am	I?,”	a	question	Marya	Schechtman	labels	“the	characterization	question.” 15 	There	 are	 actually	 two	 closely	 related	 concepts	 here.	 Sometimes	philosophers	are	interested	in	what	they	call	“the	true	self.”	An	account	of	the	true	self	is	an	account	of	which	character	traits,	values,	beliefs,	etc.	are	truly	definitive	of	a	 particular	 person.	 Sometimes,	 however,	 philosophers	 are	more	 interested	 in	 an	individual’s	own	self-conception,	the	particular	way	that	she	answers	for	herself	the	characterization	 question.	 Either	 way,	 however,	 on	 most	 such	 views,	 character	identity	 is	 primarily	 defined	 in	 psychological	 terms.	Who	 I	 am	 depends	 on	 things	like	my	personality,	my	values,	my	characteristic	responses	to	things,	and	so	on	and	so	forth.	Although	interesting	questions	can	arise	about	who	someone	really	is	if	or	when	 her	 self-conception	 and	 the	 facts	 about	 her	 psychology	 diverge,	 for	 the	purposes	 of	 this	 project	 such	 issues	 are	 not	 really	 important.	 We	 are	 simply	interested	in	how	much	change	a	self	(or	a	self-conception)	can	undergo	before	we	have	a	new	self	(or	before	a	person’s	self-conception	is	so	different	as	to	be	a	new	self-conception).	 The	 notion	 of	 self	 may	 seem	 more	 relevant	 to	 explaining	 the	badness	of	certain	radical	changes.			 Unfortunately,	 these	 views,	 though	 interesting	 and	 important	 in	 many	respects,	 tend	 to	 be	 vague	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 questions	 that	 interest	me.	 How	much	change	and	what	kind	of	change	is	compatible	with	being	the	same	self	or	the	same	 person	 in	 the	 characterization	 sense?	 What	 accounts	 for	 the	 difference	between	a	 case	where	 a	 change	occurs	 and	what	we	have	 afterwards	 is	 the	 same	person	with	some	different	qualities	(call	this	“old-self-modified”)	and	cases	where	so	much	has	changed	that	now	we	have	a	new	person	entirely	(call	this	“new-self-
																																																								15	See	Schectman	(1996)	and		“Staying	Alive:	Personal	Continuation	and	a	Life	Worth	Living,”	in	
Practical	Identity	and	Narrative	Agency,	(eds.)	Kim	Atkins	and	Catriona	Mackenzie	(New	York:	Routledge,	2008),	31-55.			
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formed”)?	 It	 is	presumably	a	matter	of	degree,	 and	different	 theorists	will	 answer	differently.	Obviously,	because	the	Chloe	case	is	so	extreme,	almost	any	view	will	see	it	as	a	case	of	new-self-formed.	But	recall	that	we	want	an	account	that	allows	us	to	draw	a	plausible	line	between	a	case	like	Chloe’s	and	a	case	like	Sharon’s.	We	want	to	continue	to	be	able	 to	say	 that	radical	change	 is	 the	best	option	 for	Sharon	and	that	 she	 has	most	 prudential	 reason	 to	 choose	 it.	We	 don’t	want	 to	 purchase	 the	right	 answer	 for	 Chloe	 at	 the	 price	 of	 giving	 up	 our	 claim	 about	 Sharon.	 Thus	everything	 turns	 here	 on	whether	 theories	 of	 the	 self	would	 see	 Sharon	 after	 she	takes	the	meds	as	a	new-self-formed	or	as	an	old-self-modified.			 Consider	 then	 a	 cluster	 of	 popular	 theories	 of	 self	 united	 by	 the	 emphasis	they	place	on	a	person’s	core	values.	Call	these	value	theories	of	self.	For	example,	many	 theorists,	 inspired	 by	 Harry	 Frankfurt	 have	 come	 to	 understand	 the	 self	 in	terms	of	commitments	 (and	values)	 that	are	made	(or	adopted)	by	a	higher-order	self	(or	perhaps	the	rational	self).16	Frankfurt	actually	says	more	about	personhood	than	 selfhood.17	He	 gives	 us	 an	 account	 of	what	 it	 takes	 for	 a	 person	 to	 remain	 a	person	(as	opposed	to	a	non-person).	Roughly	 for	Frankfurt	personhood	 is	 tied	 to	the	capacity	for	developing	stable	higher-order	attitudes.	Lose	that	capacity	and	you	will	 cease	 to	 be	 a	 person.	 However,	many	 people	 interested	 in	 the	 self	 have	 also	been	inspired	by	Frankfurt’s	ideas,	and	it	is	clear	why.	There	are	materials	here	that	seem	well	 suited	 to	answering	 the	characterization	question.	Who	 I	 am	at	a	given	time	may	also	be	determined	by	the	attitudes	of	the	higher-order	self,	or	the	rational	self.	What	I	come	to	value	in	this	reflective	way	may	serve	as	an	account	of	who	I	am,	most	fundamentally.																																																										16	Schechtman	 (1996,	 2008)	 among	others	 cites	 Frankfurt	 as	 an	 example	 of	 someone	who	offers	 a	theory	that	can	be	read	as	an	answer	to	the	characterization	question.	Another	example	she	cites	is	Christine	Korsgaard,	The	Sources	of	Normativity	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996);	and	
Self	 Constitution:	 Action,	 Identity	 and	 Integrity	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2009),	 though	Schechtman	writing	in	2008	cites	the	version	that,	at	the	time,	was	available	on	Korsgaard’s	website.		17	See	e.g.	Frankfurt,	“Freedom	of	the	Will	and	the	Concept	of	a	Person,”	Journal	of	Philosophy	68:	1:	(1971):	5-20.	For	other	Frankfurt	essays	key	to	the	interpretation	of	theorists	like	Schechtman	see	“The	Importance	of	What	We	Care	About,”	Synthese:	An	International	Journal	for	Epistemology,	
Methodology,	and	Philosophy	of	Science.	53:	2:	(1982):	257-	272;	“Identification	and	Wholeheartedness		In:	Responsibility,	Character	and	the	Emotions:	New	Essays	in	Moral	Psychology,	ed.	Ferdinand	Schoeman	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1987),	27-45;	“Identification	and	Externality,”	In:	The	Identities	of	Persons,	ed.	A.	Rorty	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1976),	239-52.	
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	 However,	this	still	doesn’t	help	us	to	answer	the	question	of	when	a	person	(without	 ceasing	 to	 be	 a	 person)	 becomes	 different	 enough	 to	 count	 as	 a	 new	 or	distinct	person.	Presumably	I	could	maintain	throughout	life	the	capacity	for	higher-order	thought	(and	so	always	remain	a	person),	even	while	changing	my	mind	about	some	of	the	things	that	matter.	I	doubt	any	advocate	of	such	a	view	would	deny	that.	But	what	they	don’t	say	is	how	much	such	change	is	compatible	with	remaining	the	same	 person	 in	 the	 characterization	 sense.	 Alas,	 there	 is	 no	 precise	 answer	 to	 be	found.	 So	 it	 remains	unclear	whether	 this	 kind	of	 approach	would	 count	 Sharon’s	changes	as	sufficiently	radical	to	make	her	a	new	person.			 Still,	 somewhat	worrisomely,	 it	 seems	plausible	 that	a	philosopher	working	in	this	vein	might	say	that	post-medication	she	is	a	new-self.	A	few	years	out	from	her	change	(if	she	undergoes	it)	she	will	care	very	little	about	most	of	the	things	that	seemed	important	to	her	before.	People	who	knew	her	before	will	be	struck	by	the	depth	of	the	change.	Our	goal,	however,	is	to	find	a	way	to	use	the	notion	of	identity	to	distinguish	between	Sharon	and	Chloe.	So	only	if	we	are	certain	that	such	a	view	of	self	can	accommodate	the	intuition	that	Sharon’s	change	is	best	for	her	should	we	appeal	to	it.		 Now	consider	briefly	a	very	different	approach	to	understanding	the	self	and	answering	 the	 characterization	 question.	 This	 is	 a	 type	 of	 view	 that	 has	 become	quite	 popular	 in	 recent	 years:	 the	 narrative	 self	 view.18	Though	 there	 are	 many	variants	of	this	approach,	the	basic	idea	is	easy	enough	to	grasp:	it	is	that	a	person’s	self	 is	constituted	by	a	narrative.	This	narrative	 is	 the	story	she	tells	herself	about	herself	and	about	what	has	happened	to	her	and	why.	It	 is	composed	of	much	less	than	 all	 the	 things	 that	 have	 happened	 in	 her	 life.	 Rather	 it	 incorporates	 those	happenings	that	seem	important	to	her,	and	that	stand	in	special	narrative	relations	to	other	events	 in	her	 life.	Nor	are	 these	events	 limited	 to	 just	 the	ones	 that	seem	good	to	her.	Rather,	the	narrative	incorporates	events	both	good	and	bad	that	need	to	 be	 understood	 or	 that	 help	 to	 make	 other	 events	 intelligible.	 The	 themes	 and	patterns	that	emerge	help	individuals	create	meaning	out	of	what	might	otherwise																																																									18	Again,	there	are	many	examples,	but	Schechtman	(1996)	is	a	main	defender.	DeGrazia	(2005)	also	accepts	a	narrative	view	of	self.		
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seem	like	a	random	series	of	events.	This	self-constituting	narrative	allows	a	person	to	make	sense	of	where	she	has	been	and	where	she	is	going.			 As	 before	 we	 want	 to	 know	 whether	 the	 narrative-self	 view	 can	 handle	Sharon.	 It	 is	 pretty	 clear	 that	 it	 will	 deem	 Chloe	 to	 be	 a	 new-self	 after	 the	magnificent	 alteration.	 After	 all,	 there	 could	 be	 no	more	 thorough	 disruption	 to	 a	narrative.	Yet	presumably	the	narrative	self	view,	 like	value	based	theories	of	self,	can	accommodate	a	certain	degree	of	change	as	long	as	there	is	a	way	to	make	sense	of	the	change	within	a	single,	coherent	story.	The	story	must,	however	incorporate	what	 has	 happened	 before	 the	 change	 and	 after	 it.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 huge	 constraint,	since	stories	can	develop	 in	so	many	ways.	For	any	particular	beginning	 there	are	presumably	many	coherent	continuations.			 And	yet,	even	so,	I	don’t	know	whether	such	a	theory	could	be	trusted	to	give	the	right	verdict	about	Sharon.	Sharon	has	a	self	narrative	 that	she	has	developed	over	 time.	 Indeed,	 as	 explained	 earlier,	 part	 of	 her	 resistance	 to	 taking	 the	medications	is	that	she	worries	it	will	change	her	in	ways	that,	from	the	perspective	of	her	current	narrative,	are	incoherent.	Suppose	she	takes	the	meds.	For	her	to	reap	the	 benefits	 of	 the	 change,	 sooner	 or	 later	 she	will	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	changes	 she	 thought	 would	 be	 bad	 are	 not	 really	 so.	 But	 this	 will	 require	abandoning	key	elements	of	the	old	story.	For	example	she	may	eventually	have	to	admit	 that	her	 earlier	 self	was	not	nearly	 as	 “deep”	 as	 she	 took	herself	 to	be,	 nor	were	others	so	“shallow.”	 I	would	thus	not	be	surprised	if	 it	were	difficult	or	even	impossible	to	find	a	single	coherent	narrative	that	could	incorporate	all	of	this	in	the	right	way.	Again,	until	we	are	sure	the	narrative	self	view	can	give	the	right	verdict	about	 Sharon,	we	 should	not	 appeal	 to	 it	 to	 draw	 the	 line	 between	 good	 and	bad	radical	change.			 		
§5.0	Persons,	The	Self	and	Welfare			 I	 have	 described	 a	 problem	 that	 arises	 in	 one	 form	 or	 another	 for	 many	theories	 of	 welfare,	 namely,	 the	 problem	 of	 radical	 change—the	 problem	 of	capturing	deeply	held	intuitions	to	the	effect	that	certain	kinds	of	extreme	changes	
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could	either	never	be	prudentially	best	or	could	only	rarely	be	so.	I	have	also	tried	to	explain	why	what	might	seem	like	the	most	obvious	response	to	this	problem	will	not	straightforwardly	work.	In	this	last	section	I	present	considerations	that	suggest	that	 the	 whole	 general	 strategy	 of	 appealing	 to	 characterization	 identity	 is	misguided.	I	then	sketch	an	alternative	approach.			 Ordinarily	we	 tend	 to	 suppose	 that	we	 have	 at	 least	a	 reason	 to	 resist	 too	much	change	to	our	selves,	to	who	we	are.	Of	course,	this	reason	can	be	overridden	if	 enough	 factors	 point	 a	 different	 way.	 But	 it	 would	 presumably	 take	 a	 lot	 to	override	 it.	Yet,	what	makes	us	think	we	have	such	a	reason?	There	may	be	moral	reasons	 in	 the	 vicinity.	 But	 even	 so,	 if	 that	 is	 all	 we	 can	 say,	 we	 have	 not	 done	anything	 to	 block	 the	 conclusion	 about	 welfare.	 The	 intuition	 we	 started	 with,	however,	was	precisely	that	radical	change	was	bad	for	Chloe.	What	we	would	need	instead	 is	 a	 prudential	 reason	 to	 remain	 as	we	 are.	 But	why	 think	 remaining	 the	same	has	general	prudential	value?			 If	we	 set	 aside	 temporarily	 the	 cases	we	 have	 been	 discussing,	we	 can	 see	that	in	many	real	life	situations	radical	change	is	prudentially	bad.	Moreover,	radical	changes	are	 risky	because	 in	 real	 life	 it	 is	 so	hard	 to	know	what	 the	net	effects	of	such	a	comprehensive	change	will	actually	be.	These	facts	may	explain	our	general	presumption	against	radical	change,	but	they	don’t	support	a	reason	not	to	change.	And	they	don’t	help	us	with	Chloe.		 There	are	other	reasons	why	we	are	usually	strongly	resistant	to	change.	On	most	views	of	the	self	a	person’s	values	are	a	key	component	of	who	she	is.	But	it	is	at	least	partly	constitutive	of	genuinely	valuing	something	that	one	takes	oneself	to	be	correct	in	doing	so.19	In	other	words,	if	I	value	a	certain	kind	of	project,	I	not	only	approve	 of	 it	 or	 see	 value	 in	 it,	 but	 I	 may	 feel	 that	 I	 would	 be	 mistaken	 not	 to	approve	of	it	and	also	mistaken	not	to	have	it	in	my	life.	While	understandable,	this	seems	to	conflate	the	value	something	has	in	itself	(in	terms	of	which	it	may	merit	a																																																									19	For	 example,	 Jaworska	writes,	 “one	would	 always	 view	 the	possibility	 of	 not	 valuing	 something	one	currently	values	as	an	impoverishment,	loss,	or	mistake.” Agnieszka	Jaworska,			“Respecting	the	Margins	of	Agency:	Alzheimer’s	Patients	and	the	Capacity	to	Value.		Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	28:	2:	(1999):	105-38.			
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positive	evaluation)	and	its	prudential	value	for	me.	Even	if	the	thing	has	great	value,	it	might	not	be	a	mistake	to	remove	it	from	my	life.	Again,	however,	this	explanation	of	our	attitudes	does	nothing	to	justify	them	or	show	that	we	have	reason	to	resist	self	change.			 Perhaps	one	might	argue	that	radical	self-change	just	is,	in	itself,	a	brute	kind	of	 prudential	 bad,	 one	 that	 has	 significant	 negative	weight	 and	which	 gains	more	negative	weight	as	change	becomes	greater.	Of	course,	 it	would	still	be	 just	one	of	many	 prudential	 goods	 and	 bads	 that	would	 factor	 into	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 net	value	 of	 a	 possible	 future,	 but	 because	 of	 it	 is	 so	 very	 bad,	 really	 radical	 change	would	rarely	(if	ever)	turn	out	to	be	prudentially	best.	This	yields	the	right	answer	at	the	price	of	great	mystery.	What	could	motivate	such	a	move?			 If	 that	 general	 line	 of	 thought	 goes	 nowhere,	 then	 perhaps	 we	 should	reconsider	 the	 resources	 available	 within	 the	 FBR.	 One	 important	 kind	 of	consideration	 can	be	brought	 to	bear	 to	 explain	why	many	 radical	 changes	would	not	be	prudentially	best.	Whenever	a	person	undergoes	a	radical	change	there	will	be	 transition	 costs.	 The	 greater	 the	 change	 the	 greater	 the	 transition	 costs.	 For	example,	if	I	have	changed	dramatically,	I	may	not	enjoy	or	even	have	the	aptitude	for	many	of	the	things	I	once	did.	So	I	will	need	to	find	new	projects	to	engage	me.	I	also	might	need	to	find	new	friends	or	form	new	relationships.	I	might	need	to	find	a	new	career.	Yet	all	of	these	things	take	time.	While	I	am	working	to	re-create	my	life	there	will	be	a	period	of	time	where	I	have	lost	the	old	goods	and	do	not	yet	have	the	new	ones.	So	there	will	be	a	period	of	very	low	perhaps	even	negative	welfare	value.			 The	 thing	 to	 notice	 is	 that	 any	possible	 future	 that	 involves	 radical	 change	and	 yet	 has	 net	 positive	 welfare	 value	 is	 one	 where	 the	 good	 that	 follows	 the	transition	must	be	so	good	it	can	compensate	for	the	bad	and	still	tip	the	balance	to	the	positive.	If	the	transition	costs	are	big	enough	then	the	goods	that	follow	must	be	
tremendous.	Finally,	if	a	possible	future	is	best	(as	opposed	to	just	net	positive),	then	it	will	have	to	be	good	enough	to	cancel	the	transition	costs	and	still	come	out	with	more	positive	 value	 than	other	 relevant	 possibilities,	 and	 there	will	 typically	 be	 a	number	of	these	all	of	which	involve	less	change.	This	is	a	steep	requirement.		
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	 However,	 I	 don’t	 deny	 that	 some	 theories	 will	 meet	 it.	 Yet	 which	 theories	meet	it	and	how	often	they	recommend	radical	change	will	depend	on	the	details	of	the	 theory	 of	 prudential	 value.	 Consider	 briefly	 a	 simple	 form	 of	 Benthamite	hedonism.	 Pleasure	 is	 the	 only	within-life	 intrinsic	 value,	 and	 it	 is	 construed	 as	 a	simple	feeling	the	value	of	which	is	exhausted	by	facts	about	intensity	and	duration.	Transition	costs	are	typically	highest	when	we	try	to	recreate	post	change	complex	goods	 like	 a	 network	 of	 friends	 or	 an	 engaging	 career,	 things	 that	 typically	 take	years	 to	 establish.	 But	 if	 things	 like	 friendships	 and	 careers	 have	 value	 only	instrumentally	 insofar	 as	 they	 lead	 to	 pleasure,	 then	 it	may	well	 be	 that	 the	 best	strategy	after	a	radical	change	is	to	look	for	simpler,	more	easily	attainable	sources	of	pleasure.	Assuming	there	are	some,	as	seems	plausible,	 then	there	will	be	a	 fair	number	 of	 cases	 where	 radical	 change	 is	 part	 of	 the	 best	 possible	 future	 for	 a	person.	So	she	will	have	most	reason	to	select	it.	But	those	possible	futures	will	look	quite	different	from	futures	in	which	we	work	to	establish	new	networks	of	friends.	In	short,	 simple	hedonism	would	presumably	recommend	radical	change	 far	more	often	 than	other	 theories	because	 it	has	ways	 to	minimize	 transition	costs.	But	 its	ways	of	minimizing	transition	costs	will	not	strike	many	as	really	prudentially	good,	thus	revealing	another	implausible	consequence	of	simple	hedonism.				 Suppose,	 however,	 we	 assign	 prudential	 value	 directly	 to	 things	 like	engagement	 in	 valued	 projects	 and	 the	 development	 and	 maintenance	 of	 good	relationships.	And	suppose	we	allow	that	such	things	have	much	more	value	when	(in	 the	case	of	projects)	 they	engage	more	of	our	 faculties	or	when	(in	 the	case	of	relationships)	our	 feelings	are	strongest	and	returned,	and	the	relationship	 lasts	a	long	 time.	 On	 such	 a	 view	 the	 transition	 costs	 of	 radical	 change	 begin	 to	 look	formidable.			 Even	so,	 I	 imagine	there	will	be	cases	where	radical	change	turns	out	 to	be	worth	it.	Someone	who	is	very	young	has	years	ahead	to	refashion	a	life,	 including	time	to	develop	and	nurture	new	relationships,	and	so	on	and	so	 forth.	 If	 that	 life,	once	created,	would	be	dramatically	better,	 then	 it	might	prudentially	speaking	be	worth	it	 for	this	person	to	start	over.	Even	for	someone	who	is	not	quite	so	young	but	who	 has	 no	 very	 good	 relationships	 or	 no	 valuable,	 engaging	 projects,	 it	may	
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make	sense	to	start	over.		Still,	once	we	adopt	a	more	sophisticated	theory	of	value,	transition	costs	can	go	a	long	way	towards	explaining	why	radical	change	is	rarely	the	best	option.			 Such	an	approach	can	explain	why	Sharon’s	change	is	good.	She	is	young,	her	depression	 is	undermining	her	relationships	and	she	has	 the	potential	 to	do	more	and	relate	better	if	she	changes.	As	for	Chloe,	how	we	view	the	case	may	depend	on	details	that	were	not	initially	provided.	It	was	simply	stipulated	when	the	case	was	presented	 that	 it	was	 one	where	 the	 prudential	 value	 of	 the	 possible	 future	with	radical	change	was	clearly	much	higher	than	any	others.	But	is	that	even	possible?	It	is	of	course	 logically	possible,	but	 is	 it	going	to	turn	up	a	real	possibility	given	the	world	as	it	is	and	the	facts	of	human	psychological	being	what	they	are?	Perhaps	it	would	 if	 her	 life	 to	 date	 were	 miserable,	 and	 she	 had	 no	 other	 possibilities	 that	would	lead	to	engaging	work	and	deep	relationships.	Then	it	might	be	plausible	that	the	greatest	net	value	lies	on	the	other	side	of	the	magnificent	alteration,	even	given	the	huge	transition	costs.	But	it	now	seems	like	a	very	rare	kind	of	case	indeed.			 Obviously	 I	 have	not	 solved	 these	problems	 entirely.	 It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	whether	this	approach	can	resolve	all	the	problems.	But	it	seems	more	promising	to	me	 than	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 identity.	 For	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 the	importance	of	identity	is	not	a	brute	prudential	fact.	Rather	it	matters,	when	it	does,	because	of	what	else	depends	on	 it.	Some	of	my	prudential	goods	require	that	 I	be	me.	And	since	usually	they	are	the	best	goods	open	to	me,	it	remains	important	that	I	remain	me.			 			
